The Pretoria Agreement signed by Ethiopia’s federal government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) in November 2022 ended two years of large-scale war, but it did not resolve the disputes over power, territory and security that fuelled the conflict. By 2026, political struggles, reports of renewed recruitment and clashes involving Tigrayan forces had raised fresh concerns about the durability of the settlement.
The agreement required a permanent cessation of hostilities, disarmament and reintegration of Tigrayan forces, political dialogue and the return of displaced people. It also barred the TPLF from conscription, training, deployment, mobilisation and preparations for renewed conflict.
Disarmament remained incomplete
Article 6 established the process for disarming, demobilising and reintegrating TPLF fighters. Tigrayan forces handed over heavy weapons after the agreement, and thousands of former combatants entered demobilisation programmes. The process, however, did not fully dismantle the region’s military structures.
Reports of recruitment and forced mobilisation in 2026, if confirmed, would conflict with Article 7’s ban on conscription and mobilisation. Those reports should not be treated as evidence that Tigray’s civilian population supports another war. A civilian source in Tigray said many people wanted peace and did not want a second conflict.
Key points
- About 1.9 million people were displaced by the war.
- The Tigray regional council was reinstated in May 2026 and elected Debretsion Gebremichael as president.
- Reports in 2026 described renewed recruitment and forced mobilisation in Tigray, but those reports were not presented as confirmed.
- Fighting was reported in Tselemt, Alamata, Korem and western Tigray.
The TPLF regained political leverage
From 2024, the TPLF became increasingly divided over its direction after the war. Getachew Reda was removed as head of Tigray’s interim administration in 2025 and replaced by Lieutenant General Tadesse Werede.
The Tigray regional council’s reinstatement and election of Debretsion Gebremichael in May 2026 strengthened the faction around him. The changes showed that the TPLF remained a powerful political force while the region’s post-war authority structure was still unsettled.
Political disputes were followed by renewed clashes
In January 2026, Tigray Defence Forces-aligned troops crossed the Tekeze River into the disputed Tselemt district and clashed with Ethiopian federal forces. Later, TDF-aligned fighters took control of Alamata and Korem after a federal command post withdrew.
Fighting broke out again in August in western Tigray near the Sudanese border. The federal government and the TPLF blamed each other, and responsibility for starting the clashes remained disputed. The incidents nevertheless showed that organised armed forces could still mobilise and contest territory.
Former opponents are exploring new alliances
The post-Pretoria period has included reports of closer contacts between Eritrean officials and elements of the TPLF, despite the two sides having fought each other in the 1998–2000 border war and the 2020–22 Tigray war. Ethiopia has accused Eritrea of supporting the TPLF and using it as a proxy; Eritrea rejects that characterisation.
A loose convergence known as Tsimdo has also emerged among groups opposed to the federal government. Reporting identified cooperation involving the TPLF, Fano, the Oromo Liberation Army and other armed groups. Fano leader Zemene Kassie confirmed the coalition’s existence while saying Eritrea was not currently part of it. The groups’ cooperation may not last, and their political aims remain different.
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