Accounts linked to the Russian military helped amplify far-right messages during the early days of the Ceuta migration crisis, reaching more than 500,000 people, according to an analysis by the counter-disinformation group 411. The narratives generated more than 720,000 views across seven languages in six hours on 1 August, based on an examination of roughly 4.5 million social media posts.
The online campaign followed reports that 49,000 people attempted to cross from Morocco into the Spanish enclave overnight. Across the wider, multi-day crisis, an estimated 72,000 migrants made their way into Ceuta. The posts described the crossings as a coordinated “assault”, alleged official complicity and, in some cases, included Islamophobic or antisemitic conspiracy theories.
At a glance:
- 411 examined roughly 4.5 million social media posts.
- The far-right narratives reached more than 720,000 views in six hours on 1 August and more than 500,000 people overall in the early days of the crisis.
- The narratives appeared in seven languages and were amplified by accounts linked to the Pravda network.
- The crisis also generated organic peer-to-peer exchanges among potential migrants about how to make the crossing.
| May 2021 | Ceuta crisis analysed by 411 | |
|---|---|---|
| Far-right mobilisation | Similar calls for nationalists to gather were issued, but mobilisation took much longer. | Nationalist groups reached Ceuta’s main square within days, according to 411. |
| Amplification | Far-right narratives spread more slowly. | The narratives were reproduced in seven languages and reached more than 720,000 views in six hours on 1 August. |
Two online currents shaped the crisis
The analysis found two distinct forms of online activity. Potential migrants exchanged practical information about reaching Ceuta, with young Moroccans among those who believed rumours that the border was open. Much of the “peer-to-peer logistics chatter” appeared in comments beneath viral videos.
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411 said this coordination appeared overwhelmingly organic, coming from small, anonymous-looking individual accounts rather than one identifiable recruiter channel. Separately, far-right accounts called for nationalists to gather in Ceuta and “patrol” businesses and homes; some of those calls appeared to be coordinated.
How the far-right messages spread
One origin identified in the propaganda barrage was Rybar, a Telegram channel with links to Russian intelligence. Its parent company has been sanctioned in Europe. A network of repeater accounts then circulated Rybar’s posts, including accounts linked to the Pravda network, which spreads Kremlin propaganda worldwide.
Saman Nazari of Alliance4Europe said the pattern suggested some form of machinery or structure behind the escalation, while stressing that further investigation was needed to determine whether closed forums or similar groups were involved. Ned Mendez, 411’s lead researcher, said the content moved much faster than during a comparable Ceuta incident in May 2021.
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Why researchers see a wider concern
The analysis said the far-right mobilisation reached Ceuta within days, whereas similar calls in 2021 took longer to produce a response. Mendez compared the distribution system to an organised information “superhighway” that gives selected content an amplification advantage.
411 said the broader concern was the existence of relay networks that could rapidly circulate similar narratives during another border incident in the Mediterranean. The analysis did not establish who selected the content for amplification or identify a single organisation directing all of the activity.
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